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 4  
 Hermeneutics and Education 
 4.1 Introduction 
 Th is chapter considers the implications of philosophical hermeneutics for 
the well-known  ‘ pedagogical triangle ’ of teacher, student and subject matter. 
We fi nd our way to what is specifi cally educational in the hermeneutic 
dialogue by considering examples of defi cient or degenerate conversation. 
Th e close relationship between the  ‘ instructional ’ (or pedagogical) triangle 
and the hermeneutic situation can then be emphasized, particularly once 
we acknowledge Heidegger ’ s requirement that the teacher must learn to  ‘ let 
learn ’. All hermeneutic situations, it will be shown, are educational. How, 
then, moving beyond this global understanding, can hermeneutics inform 
those local situations that we wish to think of as  specifi cally educational 
(i.e.  schooling)? Th is leads us to consider the constellation of hermeneutic 
circles that constitute the event of classroom learning. An important 
distinction will be made between the  ‘ object of study ’ and the  ‘ subject matter ’. 
Th e subject matter  – Gadamer ’ s  die Sache  –  ‘ emerges ’ in the event of learning, 
which implies a transformation of teacher, student and curriculum. We are 
then well equipped to consider the preoccupation in RE in England and 
Wales with the relation between  learning about and  learning from , which 
reveals itself to be serendipitously attuned to Gadamer ’ s observations about 
the relationship between  interpretation and  application , and thus of broader 
educational signifi cance than simply the RE context.  
 4.2 Defi cient dialogues 
 In the event of understanding a new understanding is reached. Th is is an event 
in tradition which transcends participants in the dialogue. Th e ontological 
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signifi cance of this event as a moment of self-transformation of each of the 
participants has been emphasized. But let us consider the explicit  educational 
signifi cance: every hermeneutic event, in being directed towards a new 
understanding, aims at learning. Th e question then naturally arises: in dialogue, 
what is learnt  about (and in RE in the context of England and Wales, we might 
also add learnt  from )? Th is can be further explored by considering some 
derivative dialogic situations in which a new understanding is  not reached. 
 One form of degenerate dialogue has already been introduced in the 
discussion of  ‘ empathy ’ in the previous chapter: the exclusion of the other 
that comes about when we pursue mutual understanding without aiming for 
agreement over the subject matter. In an early discussion of dialogue, Gadamer 
acknowledges that we do not in conversation  only learn about the subject 
matter, but also about our interlocutor  –  ‘ For in speaking about something, 
Dasein always expresses  itself at the same time ’ (1991: 37). Th is raises the 
possibility of a dialogue which does not have agreement as its aim:  ‘ Its motive is 
not to secure the disclosure of this matter, but, rather, to enable the participants 
themselves to become manifest to each other in speaking about it ’ or for each  ‘ to 
become explicitly visible in his being to the other ’ (37).  ‘ Community cohesion ’ 
defences of RE have oft en drawn on this form of  ‘ being with one another ’ (for 
an early example, see Schools Council 1971: 23). Th e argument goes, that once 
the possibility of agreement over contested questions has been put aside, our 
aff ective relationship with others stands to improve through this kind of mutual 
understanding. Gadamer contends that this form of dialogue has a distinctly 
diff erent ethical signifi cance:  ‘ For a person who thinks that he understands 
another person who contradicts him in some way and that he understands him 
without agreeing with him has by that very means protected himself from the 
other person ’ s contradiction ’ (37) and  ‘ one rigidifi es oneself in ways that make 
one, precisely, unreachable by the other person ’ (38). Th is kind of  ‘ being with 
another ’ both  ‘ pushes the other person away ’ and claims  in advance of the event 
of dialogue an understanding both of the other and of oneself according to 
which this holding at a distance is justifi ed (38).  
 Sometimes we might fi nd ourselves reaching a fi nal agreement in dialogue. 
At this point the conversation comes to a satisfying end. More oft en than not, 
however, we fi nd that we do not agree or do not fully agree. Th is does not 
indicate an unsuccessful dialogue, but an  ongoing one:  ‘An inability to come 
to a shared understanding is never a fi nal outcome but indicates only that one 
has been unable to bring the process of understanding to a conclusion, and 
therefore requires resumption of the conversation ’ (Gadamer 1991: 39). Recall 
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the provisionality of the agreement entailed in understanding: the dialogue 
continues because we agree suffi  ciently over the way in which the issue at 
hand is to be interrogated for there to be a need for further dialogue over our 
diff ering standpoints. We must  ‘ agree to disagree ’ in that we must agree  in order 
to meaningfully and productively disagree, and for the dialogue to continue. But 
this is not the sense in which we normally use the expressions  ‘ agree to disagree ’ 
or  ‘ agree to diff er ’. Th ese more oft en refer to those situations where we come 
to an understanding that we will not, or cannot, agree. Gadamer observes that 
this failure to reach an understanding  ‘ is sometimes interpreted in such a way 
that the contradiction that has emerged is taken as a positive result  – that is, as 
showing a diff erence in assumptions that are not open to discussion ’ (39); here 
we  ‘ discover ’ that the source of our disagreement is our holding two irreducible 
standpoints (one might, in RE, refer to our holding a  ‘ theistic ’ or a  ‘ secular 
worldview ’, for example).  ‘Agreeing to diff er ’ at this point prematurely closes 
down dialogue and  ‘ excludes the other person in his positive function ’ (40). 
Our relevant assumptions do not constitute an infl exible bedrock for dialogue 
and are not undiscussable: for Gadamer the dialogue continues by  ‘ (precisely) 
making those assumptions the subject of the conversation ’ (40). 
 We should clarify at this point an issue of intentionality which will become 
more signifi cant as the chapter progresses. I have not claimed that our interlocutor 
(or the speaker herself) cannot become the subject matter ( die  Sache ) of the 
dialogue. We have observed already that each is always necessarily implicated 
and transformed in any event of understanding, but we can also conceive of 
a form of dialogue that is  ‘ about ’ us or our interlocutor more directly, such 
as when we engage in conversation about our real motives for a particular 
action, or about whether we are well suited for a future career. In educational 
contexts we might have such conversations in a mentoring situation, or when 
we meet with pupils to discuss their targets and achievements. In these kinds of 
situations, it is more appropriate to say that one of the interlocutors has in fact 
emerged in some way as the subject matter of the dialogue,  as well as their being 
learnt about in the usual way,  ‘ in passing ’ as we consider some further issue. 
Th is said, what marks out a dialogue from a defi cient form, in this case, remains 
the desire to reach agreement. If we  ‘ agree to diff er ’ with a friend about the career 
to which we are most suited, this is tantamount to saying that we do not value 
their opinion suffi  ciently to continue exploring the reasons for our diff erence 
on this important matter. If a teacher  ‘ agrees to disagree ’ with a student over 
the student ’ s achievement in the last term, neither stands to learn from the other 
any longer.  
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 Th ere are other forms of defi cient  ‘ being with ’ one another. Sometimes we 
shoot the breeze. Two or more people engage in aimless conversation. We are 
passing the time. We might throw some jokes around, taking pleasure possibly 
in the act of speaking itself, but with nothing specifi c or important on the table 
or commanding our attention. Here we are engaging in what Heidegger calls 
 Gerede (translated in Macquarrie and Robinson as  ‘ idle talk ’ ). Heidegger claims 
not to disparage this everyday phenomenon, but nevertheless his ontological 
exploration marks it out as a degeneration from the kind of relation that 
Gadamer denotes by term  ‘ dialogue ’ (1967: 211 – 4). He writes:  
 Because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-of-Being towards the 
entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not 
communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial 
manner, but communicates rather by following the route of  gossiping and  passing 
the word along. (212)  
 What is lacking in such an exchange is a relationship to  die Sache , the subject 
matter or the issue at stake. Th is is not to say that such an exchange does not 
involve mutual understanding, but rather that it does not advance or transform 
the participants beyond the shared understanding or  ‘ average intelligibility ’ that 
 ‘ has already been  “ deposited ” in the way things have been expressed ’ (211). Th ere 
is  ‘ a hidden way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted ’ to 
which  ‘ Dasein is constantly delivered over ’ (ibid.).  
 What goes on when we engage in  Gerede is that we reinforce or preserve this 
shared or  ‘ average understanding ’, or it is perpetuated through us. States of mind 
are thus perpetuated in  ‘ wider circles ’ and take on an  ‘ authoritative character ’   – 
 ‘ Th ings are so because one says so ’ (212). Th ere is a closing off  of possibilities for 
new disclosure because we  ‘ do not so much understand the entities which are 
talked about; we already are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such ’   – 
we engage in a verbal form of scribbling (212). In such situations, everything 
has already been understood; Being has already been disclosed. No hermeneutic 
circle is at play here, and no  event of understanding occurs.  
 Although the ontological implications of these claims extend beyond a literal 
speech situation, one can illustrate idle talk by turning to those public  ‘ gnomes ’ 
of everyday speech, such as:  ‘ You get what you pay for ’ or  ‘ You win some, you 
lose some ’. Such claims do not admit of challenge, but expect assent; they contain 
and restrict the possibilities for the further development of the dialogue. Idle 
talk can then be seen to have an ethical implication. Th ere are other gnomes  – 
like, maybe,  ‘ One ought not to speak ill of the dead ’ (or a whole host of other 
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 ‘ one oughts ’ or  ‘ one shouldn ’ ts ’ )  – that call to mind Heidegger ’ s critique of  ‘ das 
Man ’ or  ‘ the they ’ :  
 Th e dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has 
already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood  – that is, for the 
basic way in which Dasein lets the world  ‘ matter ’ to it. Th e  ‘ they ’ prescribes one ’ s 
state-of-mind, and determines what and how one  ‘ sees ’. (213) 
 Th is is not, of course,  all bad  – the  ‘ public way in which things have been 
interpreted ’ constitutes the essential background from which intersubjective 
talk can emerge:  ‘ In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, 
interpreting and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are 
performed ’ (213).  
 Heidegger criticizes idle talk as  ‘ groundless ’. Th is charge needs careful 
consideration so that it is not confused with the call for a foundational perspective 
beyond the hermeneutic circle, or outside of language. It refers rather to the fact 
that  ‘ understanding has been uprooted ’ (214) so that the participants in this kind 
of talk are no longer allowing themselves to be conducted by the thing or the 
issue at hand. A  Dasein that maintains itself in idle talk is described as  ‘ alongside 
the world ’ and  ‘ toward itself  ’. Th is topological language constitutes a clarifi cation 
of the intentionality of idle talk, in which participants have fallen out of the usual 
relationship of  ‘ belonging ’ to a subject matter. Where dialogue participants are 
bound together by a common concern, and are thus bound to the subject matter, 
nothing can be understood without  ‘ making the thing one ’ s own ’ rather than 
relying on an  ‘ undiff erentiated kind of intelligibility ’ (Heidegger 1963: 213).  
 Although  ‘ shooting the breeze ’ or making small talk might appear to have 
little to do with the classroom context, Heidegger ’ s  Gerede identifi es a possible 
situation where a concern with a shared subject matter has been replaced 
by  ‘ passing the word along ’ or the transmission or perpetuation of a kind of 
 ‘ average intelligibility ’. Leaving aside his emphasis on a  particular shared subject 
matter (in the language of reality, ultimacy and transcendence), Andrew Wright 
off ers a compelling account of how a widespread public understanding that we 
must be tolerant of all beliefs, or that religious questions are simply a matter 
of opinion, has the eff ect of turning the attention of students in RE classrooms 
towards the discourse itself, or towards themselves, and away from the subject 
matter at stake. Drawing on the sociological work of Doug Porpora, he describes 
what could be construed in somewhat Heideggerian terms as a situation of 
 ‘ existential uprootedness ’ in which  ‘ contemporary society  … construes identity 
predominantly in terms of networks of relationships with family, friends 
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acquaintances and work colleagues. Th e result is a contraction of meaning: moral 
space has relevance only insofar as it impacts on social space, while metaphysical 
space is disregarded almost completely ’ (2007a: 1). Wright cites Porpora ’ s claim 
that in answer to questions like,  ‘ What is the meaning of life? ’,  ‘ we quote Douglas 
Adams or Monty Python and laugh ’ (Porpora 2001: 58). Bereft  of a mutual 
concern for the subject matter, RE can become a sort of passing the word along. 
 At this point we have an opportunity to develop in more detail a critique 
of Richard Rorty, who has been employed explicitly as the source for Jackson ’ s 
(1997) notion of  ‘ edifi cation ’ in RE. Elements of this critique will also 
complement our discussion of Erricker ’ s approach to RE in the previous chapter, 
for whom, recall, there is  ‘ no sense of  “ development ” except change ’ (Erricker 
and Erricker 2000: 199). In addition to explicitly appropriating Gadamer ’ s 
hermeneutics, Rorty has drawn signifi cantly on the work of pragmatist and 
philosopher of education John Dewey, as well as taking over Oakeshott ’ s motif 
of the  ‘ conversation of mankind ’. We ought to recognize that although Rorty 
intends no trivialization by employing this term, the metaphor he employs to 
characterize the conversation is a  ‘ useful ’ sort of  ‘ kibitzing ’ (2009: 393). Th is 
kind of talk is usually understood alternatively as a commentary (wanted or 
otherwise) running alongside a game or some other kind of event, or as a kind 
of idle gossiping. Recall Hogan ’ s criticism of arbitrariness in that Rorty ’ s kind of 
discourse  ‘ turns its back on anything like a joint search for truth and seeks its 
fulfi lment instead in that which is aesthetically new or diff erent ’ (Hogan 1995: 
149). Th is criticism is echoed in Garrison et al. ’ s (2012) evaluation of Rorty ’ s 
use of Dewey, in which  ‘ the relativism of vocabularies and language games may 
easily turn out as arbitrariness ’ (172).  
 Kibitzing diff ers from Heidegger ’ s  Gerede in an essential way: rather than 
drawing on a shared  ‘ average understanding ’, it requires an encounter between 
diff erent worldviews, which Rorty characterizes as  ‘ incommensurable ’. Great 
care is needed here. Rorty characterizes hermeneutics as  ‘ discourse about as-yet-
incommensurable discourses ’ (2009: 343) and presents Gadamer as a champion 
in the  ‘ struggle against the assumption of commensuration ’ (Bernstein 1991: 
89). Taking his inspiration from Th omas Kuhn, Rorty elaborates that 
 by  ‘ commensurable ’ I mean able to be brought under a set of rules which will 
tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue 
on every point where statements seem to confl ict. Th ese rules tell us how to 
construct an ideal situation, in which all residual disagreements will be seen to 
be  ‘ noncognitive ’ or merely verbal, or else merely temporary  – capable of being 
resolved by doing something further. (Rorty 2009: 316) 
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 If this is all that is meant by commensurability, then we can indeed see in 
philosophical hermeneutics a recognition of the problems of such an assumption. 
Th is is the substance of Gadamer ’ s critique of Habermas discussed in the 
previous chapter (Habermas is also one of Rorty ’ s targets here). However, Rorty ’ s 
work (and in particular his portrayal of the encounter between worldviews as 
so much kibitzing) tends towards a stronger claim for incommensurability, in 
which we could be forgiven for thinking of diff erent languages and traditions as 
 ‘ self-contained windowless monads that share nothing in common ’ (Bernstein 
1991: 92). We have seen previously that Gadamer ’ s philosophical form of 
hermeneutics entails a rejection of this claim, in that  ‘ there are always points 
of overlap and crisscrossing, even if there is not perfect commensuration. ... 
Our linguistic horizons are always open ’ (Bernstein 1991: 92). Of course, the 
claim that no two languages are ever  in principle incommensurable does not 
necessarily entail that  in any particular interpretive moment we can be sure 
that we have not failed to  ‘ understand  “ alien ” traditions and the ways in which 
they are incommensurable with the traditions to which we belong ’ (ibid.).  
 Rorty rejects a notion of truth as correspondence to some  ‘ real ’ state of 
aff airs in a world  ‘ out there ’. So far, so Heideggerian. He then rejects or radically 
reinterprets the traditional notion of objectivity, so that it  ‘ does not refer to  “ the 
way things really are ” , but to the presence of, or the hope for, agreement among 
inquirers ’ (van Veuren 1993: 191 – 2). Rorty then throws the hermeneutical 
baby out with the bath water, however, when he thus lets a relationship with 
the subject matter fall by the wayside. As we have seen previously,  ‘ Th e world is 
in the circle ’ (Hoy 2006: 194), but what is also in the circle  – as opposed to  ‘ out 
there ’  – is the relation to the subject matter. A lack of attendance to the subject 
matter, which binds participants together or keeps them in the circle, marks out 
Rorty ’ s conversation as a hermeneutically defi cient account of dialogue, despite 
his professed adherence to Gadamer and Heidegger. As Caputo observes, 
 ‘ Rorty is delighted with the critique of  “ method ” in Gadamer and Heidegger, 
but he is stalled at the notion of a  “ truth ” which eludes method ’ (1983: 662). 
In abandoning (as Heidegger does) the correspondence theory of truth  – what 
Rorty calls the  ‘ mirror of nature ’  – he takes up instead  ‘ the mirror play of words 
in which words lead to more words but never to the matter itself  ’ (663).  
 Th is criticism resonates with an aspect of idle talk, which is more concerned 
with its own discourse than with getting to grips with the truth of the matter 
at hand. Rorty ’ s  ‘ new ’ hermeneutics  ‘ seeks only to recognise the plurality of 
discourses and is content to keep a civil conversation going ’ (Caputo 1983: 
665). Although there is an emphasis on encounter, diff erence, newness and 
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tension, which is not found in idle talk, Rorty ’ s thought leads us towards a 
dichotomy where  ‘ either we are speaking about reality or we are just talking ’ 
(668); Rorty ’ s  ‘ conversation ’ or  ‘ kibitzing ’ is thus simply idle talk that has cast 
off  any ontological pretensions. Caputo reminds us of Heidegger ’ s alternative 
here, expressed in topological terms as  Dasein or there-Being, where thought 
 ‘ is not a  “ subject ” standing over and against  “ reality ”  … or an  “ object ” , but it is 
wholly given over to Being as the place where Being emerges into manifestness ’ 
(668). Th us Heidegger rejects  ‘ ocular ’ metaphors, through which the assent of 
the individual subjectivity is accorded in relation to self-evident objects, but 
maintains the matter for thought,  die Sache , through a set of aural metaphors of 
 ‘ hearing, hearkening to ’ and (in German, etymologically related to these aural 
metaphors)  ‘ belonging ’ (670). A rejection of foundationalist thinking does not 
entail a rejection of the truth of the matter, which is disclosed in language and 
exerts a call on the participants in dialogue. 
 A danger inheres in Rorty ’ s account. Infl uenced by Wittgenstein and the 
concept of language games, as well as the  ‘ pragmatist ’ account of language as 
a tool for human progress, Rorty characterizes language as both a game we 
play and as a tool we use to reach agreement. In each case, the game is one 
created by the players and the agreement is the achievement of the interlocutors. 
Th is diff ers signifi cantly from the philosophical hermeneutics presented in the 
preceding chapters. Gadamer also likens dialogue to a game, but it is a game 
that plays us; understanding is an achievement that is reached  ‘ in ’ language, but 
we do not  use the conversation in order to understand  – rather, understanding 
is an event that befalls and transforms us (and transcends  ‘ us ’, at least in the 
sense of autonomous and separate subjects relating to objects in dialogue). 
Th e Heideggerian sense of  ‘ belonging ’ can be further understood in Gadamer ’ s 
claim that we  are a conversation (2004: 340). We belong ontologically to our 
subject matter because  ‘ to conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to 
be conducted by the subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are 
oriented ’ (360 – 1). Once  die Sache is removed from this picture, it loses its power 
to conduct the dialogue and to call to attentive participants and make claims on 
them. In this case, and if language is seen as a tool to be used by participants 
with no restrictions apart from mutual assent, the danger is that the power to 
command assent could be transferred to the interlocutor with more skill in 
manipulating or employing that tool. Rorty is well known for siding with the 
sophists against Plato (Rorty 2009: 157), whereas Gadamer, as we have seen, 
favours Plato in this engagement. Th e goal of the sophists was  ‘ to defeat one ’ s 
opponents via skill of argument rather than to arrive at truth ’ (Barthold 2010: 2). 
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Where the dialogue ’ s  ‘ belonging ’ to the subject matter (Plato ’ s  ‘ ti estin ’ ) is lost, 
then, the path to rhetorical domination by superior skill lies open. Th is is not 
to say, incidentally, that philosophical hermeneutics has the power to insulate 
or protect us from rhetorical domination. Recall from the preceding chapter 
that it is Gadamer ’ s aim simply to describe  ‘ what happens to us over and above 
our wanting and doing ’ (2004: xxvi). Gadamer ’ s account of understanding  does 
allow us, however, to explain why such an instance of rhetorical domination 
would not constitute an event of understanding.  
 For Gadamer, the Platonic dialogue exemplifi es an ethical relationship where, 
 ‘ within this pure self-abandonment to the facts of the matter, the real potential 
of speaking with others consists in letting the other person help one in the 
process of gaining access to the facts of the matter ’ (1991: 39). Two related forms 
of what Gadamer calls  ‘ degenerate speech ’ arise when  ‘ a genuine co-relationship 
with the other person, in being toward the facts of the matter, is missing ’ (50). 
Th at speech can degenerate is attributed to a  ‘ possibility of human existence ’  – 
 phthonos , or the  ‘ concern about being ahead of others ’ (44 – 5). Th is can give rise to 
 ‘ inauthentic ’ or  ‘ fallen ’ speech situations in which talk  ‘ should refl ect back on the 
talker in a way that distinguishes him or her in a positive way ’ (45). Speech thus 
takes on an  ‘ agonistic ’ character, where instead of laying  ‘ one ’ s assertion open to 
the other person ’ s response ’ (39) in a repeatable motion towards agreement over 
the facts of the matter (and where a contradiction would be productive of  ‘ new 
insight ’ and point towards a new direction for the dialogue) the speaker seeks 
to cut off  the possibility of the other ’ s  ‘ free response ’ and aims rather at getting 
her agreement or refuting her. Th is in turn is made possible by a  ‘ seduction ’ that 
inheres in discourse, where speech itself can appear to have knowledge (45).  
 Separated from a need for  ‘ adequacy to the facts of the matter ’, the  ‘ strength ’ 
of an argument can be sought for its own sake, or simply for the sake of winning 
the contest. Th is is a form of degenerate speech explicitly identifi ed in Plato ’ s 
early work, where the speaker  ‘ claims knowledge of  everything ’ (47), in that she 
already knows in advance that no argument will be adequate to toppling her 
conception of the matter at hand. In this case the facts of the matter become 
unimportant (in fact concealed) and only  ‘ ascendancy over contradiction ’ 
matters to the speaker. Th is kind of speech is exemplifi ed in the making of public 
speeches, where the crowd cannot answer and only the impression made by the 
speech is important. Gadamer identifi es the counterpart of this kind of speech 
to be  ‘ refutation of others for the sake of refutation ’ (49), which has the sole 
intention of silencing the other. In each case the aim is to present oneself as  ‘ the 
one who knows ’ (51).  
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 In summary, we have seen how the defi ciency of certain forms of dialogue is 
related to the issue of intentionality, or of what dialogue is  ‘ about ’. Dialogues can 
become defi cient when participants cease to seek agreement over some shared 
concern but instead seek only to become  ‘ manifest ’ to one another, when certain 
assumptions are taken to be  ‘ undiscussable ’, or when participants engage in  ‘ idle 
talk ’ and turn their attention to the discourse rather than its subject matter. 
Th e ethical implications of this are that the other is excluded from dialogue, 
or that participants engage in rhetorical competition, or that the conversation 
is susceptible to rhetorical domination. It is the intentional relationship of 
 ‘ belonging ’ to a subject matter, which Gadamer describes as a state of  ‘ pure self-
abandonment ’ (1991: 39), that excludes these possibilities from the hermeneutic 
event of understanding. Of course, philosophical hermeneutics is in no way 
intended or able to  ensure that participants in a dialogue allow themselves 
to be conducted by the subject matter in its unfolding or emerging (which is 
tantamount to ensuring that dialogue  happens ); furthermore this will be seen to 
be particularly diffi  cult in educational contexts.  
 4.3 Th e pedagogical triangle, authority and 
the hermeneutic situation 
 Th e threefold unity of teacher, student and subject matter  – the pedagogical 
triangle  – is a commonplace in educational thought. In diagrammatic form 
(cf. Figure 4.1) it can make powerfully clear the relational aspect of education 
(it concerns the activity of both teacher and student) as well as the mutual 
belonging of teacher and student to the subject matter (they are commonly 
placed underneath the subject matter, in a subordinate position). Th e similarity 
to the hermeneutic event of dialogue is striking. Shaun Gallagher has in fact 
argued that in place of either a dialogic or textual paradigm, learning should be 
off ered as the fundamental model for understanding the hermeneutic situation 
(1992: 319 – 52). While I do not want to displace the dialogic model (because of 
its capacity in what follows to inform our understanding of learning) this fruitful 
interaction between the two contexts is acknowledged. What distinguishes 
a dialogue that is productive of understanding from defi cient versions is the 
continuing possibility that each participant might learn from the other about the 
subject matter. In fact, I would go as far as to say that (i) the pedagogical triangle 
and the hermeneutic situation constitute an identical context ( all dialogues 
are educational), but that (ii) informed by a hermeneutic understanding of 
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subject matter, the pedagogical triangle does not in fact capture what school 
practitioners would recognize as an educational context.  
 It might be objected against (i) that the distinctive roles of teacher and 
student are not replicated in the hermeneutic situation. Recall, in response, that 
the interpreter is required to approach the text with the anticipation that it has 
something to teach him. However, we have established that the interpretation of 
a text  – in which the student must make the text speak  – is a subset or special 
category of the broader dialogic paradigm, in which it makes more sense to 
think of a  doubling of the teacher-student relationship: each participant in the 
dialogue continues in the hope of learning something about the subject matter 
from their interlocutor, so that each stands as both teacher and student in the 
hermeneutic situation. Th is will not satisfy a reader who wants to maintain a 
 distinctive role for teacher and student, where the teacher has a gift  to impart to 
the student. A few further things can be said about this. Th e fi rst is that there 
is no requirement for an  ‘ equality ’ of participants in dialogue, at least in terms 
of their having an equality of prior access to the subject matter. It would be rare 
and surprising indeed, given the diversity of human horizons and the complex 
variety of experiences that go towards constituting the  ‘ eff ective history ’ of a 
particular perspective, if the prejudices of each interlocutor turned out to be 
 ‘ equally ’ suffi  cient in their grasp of the subject matter at hand; in fact, given that 
the relevant prejudices would be diff erent, and largely unthematized in advance 
of dialogue, it is not even clear what equality would mean in this situation. Th e 
Figure 4.1 Th e instructional or pedagogical triangle
Subject matter
TeacherStudent
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possibility of understanding requires rather that each approaches the other with 
the expectation that he or she has something to teach him; the recognition of 
one participant as  ‘ teacher ’ would then constitute a movement in understanding, 
and a relatively common one. Alternatively, there are those informal situations 
when we approach someone we trust as  ‘ teacher ’ and fi nd that our dialogue has 
enriched us both.  
 Let us consider that Gadamer takes the Platonic dialectic as his paradigmatic 
hermeneutic situation. Th e fi gure of Socrates and his method of questioning has 
also been off ered as the paradigmatic educational situation (cf. Hogan 1995), and 
the  ‘ learning paradox ’ of the Meno has been claimed as the defi nitive problem 
for both education and hermeneutics (Gallagher 1992; Hermans 2004; Marton 
and Booth 1997). But in his dialogic procedure  – the recognition of the aporia 
as a starting point, his claim to know nothing and his willingness to learn from 
his interlocutor, his valuing of dialogue and mutual enquiry  – it is the virtues of 
a  student or  enquirer that Socrates (or at least the mythic Socrates) is modelling. 
His authority and status as a teacher are derived from no external source and 
from no privileged epistemic access to the subject matter, but solely from this: 
the recognition that his interlocutors learn from him in dialogue.  
 Th e reality of the classroom situation is, of course, that there are teachers 
and there are students; in this sense the teacher ’ s  de facto role is predetermined 
and does not emerge in the event; nevertheless, the possibility of students ’ 
learning from their teacher rests on the teacher ’ s willingness to learn from her 
students. Th is does not require that the teacher will take away from the event a 
transformed understanding of the object of study in her discipline (although, 
speaking only anecdotally, this is a possibility to which teachers of RE are oft en 
open) but that the teacher  will nevertheless be transformed ontologically in her 
engagement with students. If she is to understand a student and be understood 
by that student, there must be a fusion of horizons in which a shared subject 
matter  – the subject matter of the classroom dialogue  – emerges. Th is entails 
that the teacher will discover and respond to particular aspects of how the 
subject matter is construed by an individual student, or particular prejudices or 
fore-conceptions that are at play in the way students are construing the subject 
matter. Th us the teacher ’ s own horizon is expanding to accommodate that of her 
students, and her own prejudices are continually transformed as the dialogue 
continues. Th ere is always the possibility that the teacher is surprised, or pulled 
up short, by a student ’ s contribution to the dialogue; she will fi nd that her 
own prejudices concerning the subject matter of the classroom dialogue are 
inadequate to following the subject matter in this new direction, and she must 
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modify her teaching practice along the way. Th is  ‘ to-and-fro of teaching  and 
learning ’ (Hogan 2009: 65) need not be consciously enacted by the teacher or 
student (recall that understanding  ‘ befalls ’ participants in dialogue rather than 
being the achievement of either participant); it is because it happens in an implicit 
and largely unthematized way  that we might, following Heidegger (2011a), 
refer to a  ‘ craft  ’ of teaching. Th is is what is intended in Heidegger ’ s instruction 
that the teacher must learn  ‘ to let learn ’ : a teacher must be open to the particular 
potentialities of her students, and the ways in which they might or might not be 
receptive to particular attempts to advance the subject matter, in much the same 
way that the carpenter must get to know his materials and not attempt to work 
against the grain of the wood. Th is is a knowledge that comes only in the event 
and cannot be theorized or worked out in advance; hence van Manen and others 
have discussed the  ‘ tact ’ of teaching (van Manen 1991; English 2014).  
 Although we have acknowledged the  de facto role of the classroom teacher, 
this hermeneutic conception of the pedagogical triangle nevertheless forces a 
reconsideration of the teacher ’ s  de jure authority or moral legitimacy; in this sense 
the teacher deserves the name only to the extent that a fusion of horizons occurs 
in the classroom dialogue. P á draig Hogan (1995) off ers the distinction between 
teaching conceived as  ‘ custody ’ (whose historical dominance he attributes to a 
Christian conception of education as imparting the gift  of redemptive knowledge, 
as discussed in  Chapter 1 ) and as  ‘ courtship ’, which he traces to a Socratic origin. 
Th e teacher who earnestly feels that a subject has  ‘ something rich and enduring 
to off er ’ (Hogan 2009: 65) does not engage in a  ‘ process ’ so much as an  ‘ unfolding 
interplay ’ or  ‘ venturing ’ (ibid.), a  ‘ wooing ’ of  ‘ students ’ attentions and eff orts ’ (77) 
that sometimes enables a student to  ‘ unearth ’ or  ‘ understand something more 
of her own particular promise, of her own aptitudes and limitations ’ (65). He 
continues:  ‘ I have to make overtures to the students on behalf of that idea ’ (66), and 
we might insert here the full gamut of tactics, sometimes successful, sometimes 
unsuccessful, that the teacher might imaginatively and tentatively employ as 
the occasion seems to demand: perhaps a version of Oakeshott ’ s list of  ‘ hinting, 
suggesting, urging, coaxing, encouraging, guiding, pointing out, conversing, 
instructing, informing, narrating, lecturing, demonstrating, exercising, testing, 
examining, criticizing, correcting, tutoring, drilling, and so on ’ (1989: 70). What 
is distinctive here, however, is that  ‘ I ’ ve put a foot wrong if, in any instance, 
my approach presumes some proprietorial claim on the minds and hearts of 
students ’ (Hogan 2009: 65). Th e contrast to Hogan ’ s portrayal of teaching as this 
kind of  ‘ heartwork ’, is to be found in those stereotypical instances where teachers 
 ‘ use a  “ teachery ” kind of voice that ’ s higher and louder than natural speech and 
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who spend much of their time giving orders and reprimands   … maintaining 
order and discipline among the ranks below themselves while conforming to the 
orders of a class of superiors ’ (67).  
 For Gadamer, authority is conceded to others in a moment of  ‘ recognition ’ or 
 ‘ free ’ acknowledgement (1986: 263). We  ‘ concede to others an authority based 
on what we perceive as their superiority in matters of judgement, knowledge 
or some other quality ’ (How 1995: 172). Th e recognition of authority, then, is 
another emergent product inseparable from the event of understanding, and 
in teaching and learning contexts, this recognition is due to the extent that 
the teacher is successful in her attempts to  ‘ open up a world ’ for her student. 
Th is does not mean that educational situations are free from the possibility of 
domination (far from it) but that  ‘ there is a distinction to be made between the 
way the powerless are forced to accept something, and an authentic acceptance, 
or acknowledgement of authority. [Gadamer] does not make the distinction 
sharp, and implies that there is no a priori way of distinguishing one from 
the other ’ (ibid.). In fact,  although Gadamer argues in  TM that  ‘ all education 
depends on ’ the fact that  ‘ the authority of what has come down to us   – and 
not just what is clearly grounded  – always has power over our attitudes and 
behaviour ’ (2004: 281), in his later response to Habermas he off ers  ‘ the  system of 
education ’ (my emphasis) as an instance where authority  is dogmatic (1986: 285). 
Th e problematic interaction between the educational or schooling  ‘ system ’ and 
the pedagogical triangle so far developed will be considered in the next section. 
 4.4 Th e new educational triangle and 
the complex of hermeneutic circles 
 Th e phenomenologist Shaun Gallagher argues, in applying what he terms a 
 ‘ moderate hermeneutical approach ’, that  ‘ education is essentially a  “ larger ” process 
than that defi ned by the student-teacher relationships or the usual conceptions 
of teaching and learning ’, including  ‘ the essential and necessary participation 
of individuals, be they teachers, students, or institutions ’ (Gallagher 1992: 
180). Drawing on the philosophical hermeneutics elaborated in the preceding 
chapters, we might say that viewing education ontologically, as a transformative 
event in the Heideggerian sense, will take into account a richer constellation 
of hermeneutic situations than has previously been considered in the literature 
of RE. Gallagher appropriates R S Peters ’ claim that  ‘ individuals are  “ put in the 
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way ” of educational experiences.  … Teachers and students fi nd themselves in a 
process that encompasses them and cannot be reduced to their individual eff orts ’ 
(180). He elaborates on this complex of interconnected dialogues as follows:  
 Learning requires (a) a dialogue or circulating relationship between an 
individual learner ’ s fore-structure and the subject matter; and (b) a dialogue 
between the teacher ’ s understanding and the pedagogical presentation. Th ese 
two kinds of dialogue or interchanges are not unrelated; as parts, they enter 
into a third dialectical interchange which constitutes the whole of the classroom 
situation  – (c) the give and take of discussion, the interchange of interpretations 
between teacher and student. (74) 
 Th e weaker contention of this book is that the literature of RE has tended to 
focus on one or other of these dialogic contexts at the expense of others  – usually 
at the level of either the teacher ’ s interaction with subject matter or the student ’ s 
understanding of the subject matter. Th us it is not uncommon for hermeneutical 
questions about the appropriate representation of religions, or the interpretation 
of religious texts, to be imported from the disciplines of religious studies or 
theology respectively (see  Chapter 2 ). Th e stronger contention of this book is 
that none of the literature to date has engaged with the ontological implications 
of the interrelation of these dialogues in the classroom context.  
 In philosophy of education, an imprecision in terminology has dogged 
attempts to fully elaborate this interrelation of hermeneutic circles. Th is impreci-
sion rests on a tendency even in hermeneutically informed accounts to refer to 
the lesson content, stimulus or object of study as the  ‘ subject matter ’ of a lesson or 
educational moment, while also translating Gadamer ’ s term  die Sache , or the mat-
ter which is at issue in the event of understanding, as  ‘ subject matter ’ . Th is leads 
to situations in which  ‘ subject matter ’ is locked into a particular location in this 
constellation (as it is even in Gallagher ’ s threefold, above) when more properly, 
if what we have here is three connected hermeneutic relationships or dialogues, 
some shared  ‘ subject matter ’ is at issue in all of them. I propose fi rstly for theoreti-
cal clarity to continue to use the term  ‘ subject matter ’ in place of Gadamer ’ s  die 
Sache , the thing or matter at hand, and to depart from ordinary pedagogical use 
and interpose the term  ‘ text ’ (albeit broadly understood in the manner elaborated 
in the preceding chapter) to denote collectively the object of study, lesson stimulus 
or content  – whatever, in short, is placed directly before the student by the teacher. 
 Th at the text is not identical to the subject matter, in the sense of  die Sache , is 
illustrated in the following diagram of the new educational triangle (Figure 4.2) 
which I view largely as the centrepiece of this work. 1 It is in relation to this model 
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of the intentionality of the learning event that I am able in Part 2 of the book to 
meaningfully advance the debate about the appropriate subject matter of RE.  
 Gallagher ’ s important insight is that although all hermeneutic situations 
can be considered educational, there is something more complicated going on 
in an educational situation like the classroom, which we might think of as a 
more  deliberate or  self-consciously educational situation than the dialogue so far 
discussed. Perhaps we might refer to the  ‘ constructed ’ educational situation, using 
the language we introduced by way of contrast to the  ‘ poetic ’ approach discussed 
in  Chapter 1 . Inspired by Gallagher ’ s threefold, we fi rstly see that in an  explicitly 
educational situation  – the classroom, for example  – three dialogic interactions 
are in play. Since each of these dialogues, as a moment of understanding, has its 
educational dimension (even if that is in the sense of self-education or of  ‘ making 
the text speak ’ ), it follows that the new educational triangle consists also of three 
interlocking pedagogical triangles of the kind I have previously described. In 
this three-in-one we see that the educational triangle is thus a  ‘ sacred triangle ’ in 
ways not anticipated even by Paul Standish ’ s use of this image (Standish 2014).  
 Th e teacher ’ s pedagogical practice is informed by an understanding of the 
text; she is thus bound to the text in a circular relationship in which some subject 
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matter is at stake. Th e student also understands the text in some way, and is thus 
bound into another hermeneutic circle in which some subject matter is at stake. 
Finally the teacher attempts to engage the student in dialogue about the text and 
guide his understanding, and the student seeks to learn from the teacher, which 
means that on the bottom line of the triangle we have the dialogic situation  par 
excellence in which both student and teacher attempt to understand each other; 
each projects his or her anticipatory understanding, and fi nds it transformed, 
in the to-and-fro of classroom interaction. Again, there is some subject matter 
at issue between them. We have already noted a hermeneutic  ‘ doubling ’ here, in 
that both teacher and student learn from each other. 
 A  deliberately or  self-consciously educational situation adds to the hermeneutic 
moment described in the preceding section in that it brings together the 
teacher ’ s understanding of the object of study, or text, with that of the student; 
it thus entails the unifi cation of three related hermeneutic moments. Students 
will understand texts to some extent regardless of their teachers ’ presentation 
of them or their intentions on their students ’ behalf. Th ere is always also the 
possibility of Dewey ’ s  ‘ collateral ’ or unexpected learning in the sense that a 
student cannot but understand his surroundings, and therefore cannot avoid 
learning, albeit in ways that the teacher might fi nd unconducive to the kind of 
classroom environment she would prefer to maintain (cf. Dewey 1998: 49). In 
that sense, any moment of understanding in which a student is involved will to 
some extent be  ‘ educational ’ (productive of new understanding), regardless of 
the teacher ’ s eff orts. Both teacher and student are involved in a great deal more 
hermeneutic circles, and their horizons are being continually transformed by 
a great deal more dialogic exchanges, than we have been able to illustrate in 
this diagram; each is at any moment already  ‘ perched on a pyramid of past life ’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002: 457). 
 But the coherence of what we would recognize as a deliberately educational 
endeavour relies on a convergence between the teacher ’ s understanding of the 
text and that of the student, which is, at least for the teacher, the aim of the 
classroom interaction. It is for this reason that the  ‘ subject matter ’ or shared 
concern has been placed in the centre of this triangle, at the intersection of 
three hermeneutic relationships. Th e moment of understanding that is relevant 
to this deliberately educational endeavour is not only one in which a student 
 ‘ understands ’ a text, or even one in which a student  ‘ understands ’ a teacher, but 
also one in which there is a convergence between the student ’ s understanding of a 
text, the student ’ s understanding of the teacher, and the teacher ’ s understanding 
of the text.  
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 Although it will resist specifi cation in advance of any particular situation, we can 
say a great deal more about this subject matter and the sense in which it emerges: 
 (i)  Th e subject matter is properly said to emerge because it is the mutual 
achievement of three hermeneutic relations which converge in the 
event of learning. Th is emergence cannot be predicted in advance, 
because the teacher necessarily cannot have  ‘ total ’ knowledge of the 
horizon of the text, or of the student ’ s horizon of understanding, and 
therefore cannot predict the ways in which each student ’ s horizon will be 
transformed in this encounter, but can only respond to and accommodate 
these transformations. Th is entails that the subject matter that emerges 
necessarily emerges  diff erently for each diff erent student in the classroom. 
In this sense,  all classroom learning is to an extent  ‘ unintended ’. Th e 
teacher ’ s anticipatory projections can never be adequate to the horizon of 
even one of her students, let alone a group of thirty.  
 (ii)  Th e situation expressed in the educational triangle is not an  ‘ ideal ’ 
situation. Granted, students and teachers can speak or act at cross 
purposes, and students can oft en fail to take seriously the demands of 
texts in ways that have been explained in this chapter. Likewise, we must 
acknowledge that teachers can fail to be open to being transformed by 
the claims of their students. Th ere is always the danger that students or 
teachers will take an  ‘ agonistic ’ approach to learning, or regard either 
teaching or learning as a contest to be won, rather than enter into a 
 ‘ co-relationship ’ of  ‘ being toward the facts of the matter ’ (Gadamer 1991: 
50). What is attempted in this diagram, however, is not a prescriptive goal 
but a description of the ontological conditions that necessarily pertain 
when mutual understanding has taken place in an educational context. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, understanding can never be 
considered  ‘ complete ’, since it entails a fusion of horizons rather than a total 
identifi cation of horizons. For this reason, however, it does not make much 
sense either to speak of any moment of understanding as  ‘ partial ’. Rather, 
we are better off  saying that,  to the extent that mutual understanding occurs , 
it consists in the constitution of a shared  ‘ subject matter ’ across the three 
dialogic relationships described, but this subject matter is always emergent 
and provisional.  
 (iii)  Th is subject matter cannot be explicitly thematized or captured in 
a theoretical abstraction. Th is is fi rstly because the subject matter 
is dynamic and subject to continuing transformation. Teacher and 
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student are each engaged in  two hermeneutic dialogues, both of 
which are circular, and therefore transformative of their horizons of 
understanding. Th e student ’ s horizon of understanding, for example, 
gives rise to anticipatory projections, or fore-structures of meaning, in 
two dialogues (that is, diagrammatically, these fore-structures run along 
two sides of the triangle). Th e two hermeneutic circles are connected, 
and a transformation of the horizon of understanding eff ected by a 
fruitful understanding within one circle will transform not only the 
fore-structure of understanding operating within that circle but also 
projected understandings in the related dialogue on the other side of 
the triangle, and vice versa. Th e student is involved in a tentative, back-
and-forth relationship with the text or object of study, but also with his 
teacher. Any provisional understanding achieved in his dialogue with his 
teacher will be applied to, and tested in, his engagement with the text. Th e 
teacher is similarly implicated in two connected circles. She brings her 
understanding of the text, and of her student, to bear on her interaction 
with that student, but this understanding is subject to transformation. She 
may (ontologically speaking)  ‘ return ’ to the text with a new fore-structure 
or projection as she comes to know more about her student, and therefore 
interrogate the text with fresh insight, or with a transformed sense of the 
question that it might pose to that student. Th is transformed sense of the 
question is then brought back into the dialogue with her student. Th ese 
to-and-fro movements along both sides of the triangle are inseparable 
for each participant. An interpreter does not step outside of one circle in 
order to participate in the other, but the alternate circle is in each case an 
enabling element of the interpreter ’ s horizon of understanding. Although 
we cannot represent this diagrammatically, another way of understanding 
this insight is to think of each of the two circles in which a participant is 
involved as being  ‘ inside ’ the other.  
 Th e second reason that we cannot explicitly thematize this subject 
matter is because it describes an ontological relationship to the world 
rather than the epistemological achievement of individuals. We have 
here a continuation of Gadamer ’ s image of linguistic circles merging into 
ever larger circles within a shared tradition, rather than the result of a 
unifi ed eff ort by individual subjects to bring some object into presence. 
Intentionality here is not to be thought of representationally, in terms of the 
subject matter ’ s  ‘ being present ’ to consciousness, but (recalling Heidegger ’ s 
response to Husserl) as a state of  being-towards, or directedness. Th e 
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co-relation to the subject matter that emerges is not one of  ‘ knowledge ’ but 
of orientation: in the moment of understanding, text, student and teacher 
come to be oriented towards the world in a related way. Th at relationship, 
as we have seen, is best understood in terms of the question  – student, 
text and teacher have come to an agreement over the manner in which the 
subject matter is to be interrogated. Th is is not to say, as we have seen, that 
there will not be a great many matters on which they  do not agree.  
 4.5 Application and belonging  – or, so what? 
 So what, indeed, does this imply for the teacher looking for methodological 
guidance? In previous chapters I have argued against the possibility of a 
critical theory or method that could ensure a student ’ s  ‘ correct ’ understanding. 
Additionally so far in this chapter I have implied, but not yet fully elaborated, a 
tension at the heart of the educational endeavour. Recall the diff erence introduced 
early on in the book between the  ‘ problem ’ and the  ‘ mystery ’. Hermeneutic 
understanding is not properly  – or at least exhaustively  – methodical, in 
that it relies on the interpreter ’ s openness to what is strange in the text. Any 
purposes that an interpreter brings to the text  – in the form of prejudices, or 
the fore-structure of understanding  – are necessarily transformed in the event 
of understanding. So the event of understanding is not a moment that could 
be  ‘ constructed ’ or prepared for in advance by one seeking understanding. Any 
 aim that an interpreter might bring to the moment of understanding stands 
to be transformed through dialogue as the interpreter himself is transformed, 
in the same way that any method will necessarily fall short of transformative 
understanding. Recall the model of play: we do not  ‘ use ’,  ‘ apply ’ or  ‘ weigh up ’ 
our prejudices. Th ey constitute our being and it is rather in the to-and-fro of the 
dialogue that productive prejudices do their work and others are transformed. 
Th us there is a necessary sense in which transformative understanding is 
 aimless; understanding does not accompany any particular method employed 
by an active subject, but rather  ‘ befalls ’ someone who is disposed in a certain 
way towards dialogue  – that is, someone who submits to being conducted by the 
subject matter. 
 A professional teacher can hardly see her work as aimless, and thus a tension 
emerges in the educational event. Th e possibility of a fusion of horizons in 
the educational event relies on that openness, on the part of both teacher and 
student, to being transformed by the unfolding dialogue. A teacher cannot 
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foresee the emergence of subject matter and must thus necessarily, as much as 
her student, commit to being conducted by the demands of the dialogue as it 
unfolds. Yet the conditions of systems of schooling are such that we think of 
learning in terms of lesson plans, units of learning, programmes of study, and 
schemes of work. A teacher who is to be considered responsible must be able 
to demonstrate a commitment to designing learning experiences in accordance 
with the most up to date research and carefully recorded evidence of student 
achievement. Since the moment of understanding is indeterminate, and in any 
case diff erent for each student, the educational imperative to  ‘ move on ’ to the 
next stage in a predetermined programme of study necessarily interrupts or 
forecloses dialogue. Rather than transforming in the to-and-fro of classroom 
interaction, the teacher or other curriculum designer ’ s prior understanding 
of the subject matter predetermines the possibilities for its disclosure in the 
learning event. Th us our most educational eff orts appear to be, in a hermeneutic 
sense, anti-educational.  
 I have argued (Aldridge 2013) that the moment of understanding is in tension 
with the curriculum or scheme. But I do not hereby describe a hopeless situation; 
this is a familiar dialectical relationship between the intended and unintended 
aspects of the classroom situation with which many teachers will readily identify. 
Some  ‘ scheme ’ is inevitable in that the teacher ’ s interaction with a student is 
structured in advance by a projection, or anticipatory understanding, of the 
contribution a particular text might make to a student ’ s development, and this 
will have been informed by the teacher ’ s anticipatory projections of her student ’ s 
horizon of understanding (the teacher ’ s  ‘ prejudices ’, you might say, in relation to 
her students). Th e tension between these anticipatory understandings and what 
 ‘ emerges ’ in the event corresponds to the tension between reconstruction and 
deconstruction in understanding elaborated in the previous chapter. It is the 
tension between fruitful and unproductive prejudice. Th is tension is resolved, 
as we have seen, in a manner which is more rightly considered  ‘ tactful ’ than 
methodical. Th ere is no doubt, however, that the teacher ’ s room for tactful 
movement is restricted, perhaps disastrously, by too close a prescription of the 
progression of curriculum content of RE, as we will explore in detail in Part 2 
of this book.  
 Given that we cannot prescribe a pedagogical method, what can be said that is 
of use to the classroom teacher, in general terms, before we go on in subsequent 
chapters to consider the specifi c challenges of RE? Granted, we cannot outline 
a procedure that will ensure  ‘ correct ’ understanding on the part of the student, 
but nevertheless  – in the descriptive spirit of what has been off ered so far in 
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this chapter  – we have said a great deal about the ontological conditions that 
will obtain whenever this convergence of three dialogic situations has occurred. 
Perhaps the aspect that will prove most illuminative for classroom practice is the 
language of  ‘ belonging ’. In the moment of understanding, teacher, student and 
text will fi nd themselves in a relationship of mutual  ‘ belonging ’ to the subject 
matter and thus, through this relationship, to each other. We might be able to 
off er, then, not a prescriptive method, but an ethical or existential orientation 
that could guide teaching practice. In the same way that understanding befalls 
a participant in dialogue who has a certain ethical disposition towards the 
dialogue  – a willingness to submit to the subject matter and an openness to 
being transformed by the claims of a partner  – so the moment of understanding 
occurs in the classroom (inasmuch as the teacher has control over this) when a 
teacher is disposed towards the educational moment in a particular way  – that 
is, has as her goal not some specifi c understanding, but the mutual  ‘ belonging ’ 
to the subject matter of teacher, student and text. 
 Without wishing to anticipate in too much detail the arguments about 
curriculum content and disciplinary identity that will follow in the second part 
of this book, the idea of belonging can be seen to cut through perennial debates 
about pupil-led versus knowledge-led curricula that still loom large in general 
educational debate. Belonging will entail that the  ‘ interests ’ of both student and 
text are taken seriously in the educational event. Th us a teacher will need to 
take into account the demands that the text is made  ‘ relevant ’ to the student, 
and also that justice is done to the text, or that the student engages in some 
way that is  ‘ authentic ’ to the concerns of the text. But these demands are not 
balanced in any way that could be determined or prescribed in advance. We have 
seen that the relationship with the subject matter is to be conceived in terms of 
the constitution of a shared question. Th is question cannot be reduced to the 
question that the pupil brings in advance to the text. Th e question is transformed 
in the moment of understanding, and becomes the question that the text puts to 
the student. Th is question similarly cannot be reduced to the question that the 
text ’ s author intended, or the question intended or understood by the community 
that produced the text (although an awareness of such considerations will 
undoubtedly inform the teacher ’ s tactful presentation of the text to the student, 
so that  ‘ the text ’ s question ’ might emerge).  
 Th e relationship of mutual  ‘ belonging ’ is illuminated in terms of the question. 
Th e student has made the thing his own (Heidegger 1963: 213) in coming to see 
the way that the text is  ‘ in question ’ for him. But he has also come  ‘ into question ’ 
in relation to the subject matter, in that the text has put a question to him; 
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understanding entails an acknowledgement of the text ’ s claim on the interpreter. 
In this way Gadamer is able to off er a critique of a deep-seated assumption in 
the history of hermeneutics, the distinction between  subtilitas intelligendi and 
 subtilitas applicandi (2004: 306 – 10) . For Gadamer, there are not two separate 
movements, in which the interpreter fi rst understands the text ’ s meaning and 
then discerns its relevance to his own situation or the manner in which it can 
speak to his own interests. Th ere is rather only a single movement, and these two 
aspects are inseparable in the event of understanding.  
 In RE in England and Wales there has been considerable debate about the 
two attainment targets, AT1 (Learning about) and AT2 (Learning from). At this 
point I recapitulate some elements of my discussion of the attainment targets 
from  Chapter 1 because I wish to off er, in keeping with Malpas ’ s notion of 
Heideggerian  ‘ iridescence ’ introduced in that chapter, another signifi cance for 
this distinction in addition to the  ‘ strife ’ between earth and world.  
 Th e attainment targets have their origins in a phenomenological distinction 
off ered originally by Grimmitt (1987), which was then formulated into two 
attainment targets in the SCAA model syllabuses in the 1990s (SCAA 1994), 
and was fi nally  ‘ canonized ’ in the non-statutory national framework (QCA 
2004). Questions have been asked about how to balance the two targets and 
about the dangers of over-emphasizing one or other aspect, as well as about 
the intelligibility of the two moments (Aldridge 2011; Maybury and Teece 
2005; Teece 2008, 2010). Robert Jackson has questioned the possibility of 
always expecting a moment of application, although he has argued that some 
critical appropriation of the religious content understood by the student 
is  desirable. Perhaps Hella and Wright have come closest to acknowledging 
the inseparability of  subtilitas intelligendi and  subtilitas applicandi when they 
have argued that coming to know the world will always imply an element of 
self-knowledge (Hella and Wright 2009, and my discussion in  Chapter 2 ). 
Some recognition of the inseparability of this moment is probably implicit 
in Erricker ’ s proposal to replace the two attainment targets with the single 
target of  ‘ interpreting worldviews ’ (Erricker 2010). However, when the two 
aspects of RE learning are seen as elements of a unifi ed ontological movement, 
rather than a prescriptive methodology, much of this debate is resolved. It 
does not make sense to require, for example, that students fi rstly understand 
a text authentically before they can apply it to their own lives, or to argue 
that relevance to a student ’ s experience takes educational priority over any 
particular religious knowledge or content. Th ere is no  ‘ undiff erentiated 
kind of intelligibility ’ (Heidegger 1963: 213) that could precede productive 
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understanding. Viewed in the light of Gadamer ’ s insight into the inseparability 
of  ‘ application ’ from understanding, the distinction between  ‘ learning about ’ 
and  ‘ learning from ’ looks not so much like a local debate within RE as a rare 
hermeneutic success in describing an ontological necessity in all learning: 
rather than  ‘ learning from ’ being a desirable possibility that might be  ‘ added 
on ’ to RE learning, there is in fact no  ‘ learning about ’ in any curriculum area 
without a concomitant  ‘ learning from ’. 
 Note 
 1 I acknowledge a shortcoming of this diagram, which to some extent Higgins attempts 
to address in his own diagrammatic depiction of the intentionality of learning (2010), 
in that I have only considered the pedagogical relationship between a teacher and 
a single student, rather than a group of students. I have also neglected the way in 
which a student ’ s interactions with other students will contribute to the constitution 
of a relevant horizon of understanding. I accept that there is more fruitful thinking 
to be done in this area, but I hope at least that in this chapter, through the focus on 
the individual dialogic exchange, I have gone some way towards addressing what 
Heidegger has termed the teacher ’ s disregard for  ‘ the diff erences and distinctions 
within the concrete student manifold ’ (2002: 40). 
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